










This paper explores the question whether perfectionism amounts to a political doctrine 
that is more attractive than liberalism. I try to show that an egalitarian liberalism that is 
open to questions of value and that holds a conception of limited neutrality can meet the 
perfectionist challenge. My thesis is that liberalism can be reconciled easily with 
perfectionism read as a moral doctrine. Perfectionism as a political doctrine equally 
stays within the value framework of liberalism. Finally, I try to show that liberalism can 
give an account of civic virtue that is a sufficient basis for developing the normative 





The extensive debates of the last two decades on the shortcomings of liberalism have 
generated a puzzling consequence B the recent renaissance of political perfectionism.1 At first 
glance, perfectionism seems an outdated doctrine. We usually associate it with the political 
theories of ancient Greek philosophers and their endeavors to bring the concept of the good 
citizen in congruence with the idea of the good polis. Perfectionism makes us think of Plato’s 
design of a state in which the rulers are in possession of greater wisdom and nobler ambitions 
than the ruled. Their epistemologically privileged position supplies Plato’s rulers with 
legitimate authority to bring citizens to live up to the ideal of the good that the rulers have 
recognized as the correct one. 
Modern democratic theory recoils from this form of perfectionism. Yet, the current 
defenders of perfectionism confront us with a different version of that doctrine. They defend a 
form of perfectionism that claims to be compatible with individual autonomy and value 
pluralism. Liberalism, so their thesis goes, has to fall back on perfectionism if it wants to 
overcome its deficiencies. 
The new emergence of perfectionism is accompanied by a renewed interest in the 
concept of civic virtue. Perfectionism is connected with the idea that societies should enact 
policies to promote the good. Since the goodness of a society depends on the moral quality of 
the conceptions that the good citizens hold and the way they act, the question of civic virtue 
becomes relevant. If one takes the line ‘the more decent its members, the better the society,’ 
then it follows that governments should take an interest in the moral standards that guide the 
behavior of citizens. But this position seems to be in direct conflict with the basic postulate of 
some dominant strands within liberalism, namely that the political institutions of a liberal 
society should be neutral towards the different conceptions that the good citizens hold. 
The rationale behind the liberal commitment to neutrality is the protection of individual 
freedom. Citizens should be free to choose what way of life they regard as valuable and worth 
pursuing. This implies that a liberal society has to tolerate some forms of life that are morally 
far from perfect. What does this mean in respect to the position of liberalism on the issue of 
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civic virtue? Can liberalism develop and defend a reasonable concept of civic virtue? Can a 
liberal society demand that its members act in conformity with a standard of civic virtue? Can 
liberalism answer the objection that it cannot uphold the neutrality postulate consistently and 
that it inevitably falls back on perfectionist assumptions? 
In this paper, I want to take a closer look at these questions. I will argue that a certain 
form of political liberalism can meet the perfectionist challenge and can give a plausible 
account of the meaning and scope of the idea of civic virtue. I will try to show that a 
democratic political community does give room to perfectionist ideals, but that it keeps 
perfectionism away from the design, aims, and justification of its basic institutions. Finally, I 
want to show that the current rise of perfectionism and the interest in civic virtue, which is 
part of a recurrent critique of liberalism, amounts to a misguided attempt to give an account of 




The principle of neutrality is a central doctrine of liberalism. In the formulations of two 
prominent defenders of liberalism, Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, it reads: 
 
It is a fundamental, almost defining, tenet of liberalism that the government of a 
political community should be tolerant of the different and often antagonistic 
convictions its citizens have about the right way to live: that it should be neutral, for 
example, between citizens who insist that a good life is necessarily a religious one and 
other citizens who fear religion as the only dangerous superstition.2 
 
[I]ndividuals find their good in different ways, and many things may be good for one 
person that would not be good for another. Moreover, there is no urgency to reach a 
publicly accepted judgement as to what is the good of particular individuals.3 
 
Historically one common theme of liberal thought is that the state must not favor any 
comprehensive doctrines and their associated conception of the good.4 
 
Perfectionists focus their criticism on the principle of neutrality since neutrality as 
regards different conceptions of the good seems a major hindrance to perfectionist ambitions. 
If neutrality does not hold, then, so their argument goes, it follows that it is plausible to regard 
one way of life as more valuable than another and some conceptions of the good as better than 
others. Still, the question is whether the rejection of the neutrality postulate and the idea that 
one alternative is more valuable than another already brings us to endorse perfectionism. In 
the following section, by looking at Dworkin’s and Rawls’s defense of neutrality, I want to 
see whether we have reason to accept the perfectionist claim that we have to give up the 
neutrality postulate of liberalism as incoherent. 
Dworkin’s position on neutrality is part of his theory of liberalism for which a basic 
postulate of equality is central, namely that citizens should be treated with equal respect and 
consideration. Dworkin interprets this abstract principle of equality as the basis for a specific 
conception of distributive equality, namely equality of resources, which states that citizens are 
considered equally if an equal share of resources is available to them. 
On the level of distributive equality, a first argument for neutrality arises. Equality of 
resources implies neutrality since no one can demand a greater share of resources than others 
on the basis of the claim that her or his way of life is more valuable and demands more 
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resources than that of others. Resources are distributed by a procedure that guarantees 
fairness, as the members of society ideally start in a situation in which they have no 
possessions and have to acquire their resource bundles in an auction. In Dworkin’s theory, a 
compensation is adequate only in the case of undeserved inequalities, inequalities that are due 
to bad luck (e.g., the case of handicapped persons) and that are not the result of option luck 
due to the risks of a freely chosen way of life. 
The abstract principle of equality gives rise to a more general argument for neutrality. 
This argument claims that it amounts to a violation of the idea of equal worth that is part of 
the principle of equality if governments were to force citizens to accept a certain conception of 
the good life. This would mean for people with a different understanding of the good life that 
their right to equal consideration is violated.5 
To understand fully Dworkin’s interpretation and justification of neutrality, one has to 
consider his account of the ethical foundations of liberalism. Dworkin does not start from a 
strict separation of the right and the good. Rather, he seeks to connect politics and ethics with 
the help of a theory of the good so that a continuity arises between the principles of liberal 
morality and the philosophical ideas of a good life. Dworkin connects justice and ethics and 
regards justice as a parameter of ethics since only someone with a just share of resources can 
lead a good life. Individuals can accept the ethical foundations of liberalism without having to 
give up their basic convictions. Liberal equality is not neutral towards all imaginable 
conceptions of the good life. Those that are not compatible with the idea of equal worth and 
the principle of equality of resources do not get promoted. The principles of justice impose 
restrictions on the permissible conceptions of the good life. So, neutrality does not forbid that 
‘a racist is thwarted who claims that his life’s mission is to promote white superiority.’6 
We can restrict the liberty to pursue different conceptions of the good on the basis of 
either reasons of justice or ethical reasons. In the first case, a society bans a certain form of 
conduct since it is incompatible with the rights justice grants. In the second case, society 
forbids a certain form of conduct since it is considered to be less valuable, degrading, 
demeaning, corrupting, or simply a bad life. Dworkin regards only the first type of reasons as 
legitimate. The fact that a group or even the majority of a society regard someone’s ethical 
convictions as wrong or demeaning cannot be a sufficient reason to restrict liberty.7 
Liberal equality is not neutral in its consequences. Some ways of life are, according to 
Dworkin’s theory, more difficult to lead, namely those that violate equality of respect and 
equality of resources. Neutrality does not mean to be indifferent to conceptions of the good. 
But in regard to the justification of public policies, neutrality is inevitable. It would be 
incompatible with equality if a government were to base its decisions on the specific 
preferences of some people about the way other people should live. 
Equally, we find a subtle defense of neutrality in Rawls’s work. One central aim of 
Rawls’s political philosophy is to show that liberalism can refer to ideas of the good without 
any commitment to a comprehensive conception of the good.8 Political liberalism appeals to 
five ideas of the good, the idea of goodness as rationality, the idea of primary goods, the idea 
of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good, the idea of the political virtues, and 
the idea of the good of a well-ordered political society. 
The priority of the right over the good establishes neutrality between different 
conceptions of the good individuals hold. Yet, the crucial question in the context of a 
discussion of perfectionist objections to liberalism is whether the reference to these different 
notions of the good does not violate the doctrine of neutrality. 
The idea of goodness as rationality attributes to people a plan of life around which they 
match their needs and organize their circumstances. This idea of goodness as rationality does 
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not violate the neutrality assumption as it is compatible with the development of particular 
conceptions of the good. Also, the primary goods conception of the good does not contradict 
the principle of neutrality since it provides the means so that citizens can hold and pursue their 
different ideas of the good.9 
The idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good indicates, however, that 
Rawls holds only a limited conception of neutrality. Political liberalism does have non-neutral 
effects as it encourages the adherence to some specific comprehensive conceptions rather than 
others. To interpret this result adequately, it is important to take Rawls’s distinction between 
procedural neutrality, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of effect or influence into account. 
Procedural neutrality is given if a certain political conception depends on procedures that are 
independent of any specific moral values. Rawls’s theory of liberalism is not neutral in this 
sense since the principles of justice central to justice as fairness presuppose substantial moral 
values and not just procedural values such as impartiality, consistency, and equal 
opportunities for all parties to present their claims. 
Justice as fairness is neutral in regard to aims. It designs the basic institutions of society 
in a way that they can be acknowledged by citizens who are adherents of different individual 
comprehensive conceptions. Rawls clearly distinguishes between neutrality of aim and 
neutrality of effect. Neutrality of effect is not given since political liberalism has effects on the 
likelihood that citizens tend to choose one comprehensive conception rather than another. 
Political liberalism is not indifferent to comprehensive conceptions since it allows only those 
that are part of an overlapping consensus and that agree to the basic principles of a democratic 
society. 
One consequence of this limited neutrality is that political liberalism is not indifferent to 
the way citizens are. Political liberalism encourages citizens to endorse certain moral and 
political virtues. The stability of a liberal society depends on the fact that a large part of the 
members of society develop the attitudes to keep to the principles of justice. The political 
virtues Rawls regards as necessary for political liberalism include forms of judgment and 
conduct that help to make possible social cooperation over time.10 The political institutions 
define the role of the good citizen as one who acknowledges the rules defining the basic 
institutions of society. Political virtues are different from those virtues that are part of a 
comprehensive religious or moral doctrine. 
The idea of the good in the form of a well-ordered political society is equally compatible 
with the idea of neutrality. A well-ordered society grants citizens equal basic rights, liberties, 
and opportunities and secures the public recognition of their status as citizens, as fully 
cooperating members of society.11 These are the basic axiological assumptions of political 
liberalism that do not amount to a comprehensive conception of the good. 
Both Dworkin and Rawls are advocates of a limited neutrality. Their political theories 
set limits on the conceptions of the good and the good life citizens can hold. The restrictions 
are set by the conception of justice that is at the center of their versions of liberalism. Liberal 
equality and justice as fairness encourage citizens to live certain forms of life and discourage 
them to adopt others. But the idea of freedom that is basic to liberalism forbids any use of 
force to bring citizens to lead certain ways of life except when these ways of life violate the 
basic legally guaranteed rights of others. Democratic societies do not allow missionary 
expeditions into the territory of personal autonomy. 
Perfectionists still criticize this position of limited neutrality. But what exactly makes 
them so uneasy? What seems wrong in granting a certain freedom in developing one’s 
personal conception of a worthwhile life? Why should a society have more ambitions than 
securing liberty and equality for citizens? 
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The main objection of the defenders of perfectionism is that this limited neutrality still 
retains too much indifference towards the various conceptions of the good that citizens hold. 
Apart from serious violations of legal norms, the government does not see good reason to 
interfere with the lives of its citizens. Perfectionists, on the other hand, consider it ‘Y the 
function of governments to promote morality. That means that governments should promote 
the moral quality of the life of those whose lives and actions they can affect.’12 Governments 
have to see to it that citizens choose more valuable forms of life than others. Societies must 
aim to establish policies that bring about an improvement. Instead of indifference, the political 
institutions must offer incentives so that citizens go for the more valuable options. 
Much depends here on the way we interpret ‘aiming for the more valuable,’ ‘striving 
for the morally better.’ If we take it to mean that a political philosophy should be based on 
certain moral foundations that support policies that seek to improve the lives of the members 
of society, then political liberalism fulfills this condition. For liberals like Dworkin and 
Rawls, neutrality of effect does not hold. Liberals have a vision of a good society and to 
attribute to them the view that they are indifferent to varying conceptions of the good and to 
the various outcomes of policies is unfair. 
There is one aspect in Dworkin’s account of liberalism that makes the objections by 
defenders of perfectionism at least understandable. For Dworkin, a liberal society has to 
tolerate demonstrations of racism and antisemitism. It has to tolerate that some people have 
bad preferences and that they make them public. This seems exactly the point on which 
perfectionists focus in their critique: Liberalism, by tolerating instead of banning bad 
convictions, does not make a distinction between deficient and valuable ways of life. 
I do not think that this conclusion is correct. Dworkin’s tolerance of racist utterances 
and demonstrations is not the result of his acceptance of the principle of neutrality. It is, 
instead, a direct consequence of his interpretation of the right to freedom of speech. For 
Dworkin, governments have no reason to ban racist or sexist utterances legally. In the 
framework of a democratic society, these utterances amount for him to an offense to feelings. 
But that, so Dworkin’s argument goes, simply cannot be the basis for a legal prohibition since 
this would give way to several forms of censorship due to claims of insult and hurt feelings. 
 Dworkin’s interpretation of the right to free speech is notoriously wide. He subsumes 
ways of acting and behaving under ‘speech’ that critics regard as forms of action.13 In respect 
to antisemitism and fascism, countries like Germany and Austria, for example, have much 
more restrictive legal regulations than Dworkin’s theory allows. Yet, in the context of our 
discussion Dworkin’s interpretation of the right to free speech has to be separated from the 
question of neutrality. I think there is good reason to criticize Dworkin’s too liberal 
understanding of the right to free speech. But his wide reading of the free speech principle 
does not imply that he is indifferent towards racism and antisemitism. He emphasizes that, 
though we cannot ban certain expressions of racism, we have every right to fight it by political 
means, and we should do so. Liberals like Dworkin do not consider racism on a par with 
valuable and ambitious forms of life. They just think that the fact that certain views are not 
morally valuable is not a valid reason to prohibit their public demonstrations. 
Any decent political philosophy must make a distinction between the good and the bad, 
the valuable and the mean. Liberalism has a sense of affirming the valuable and the search for 
a better society. Since liberal neutrality does not reduce to indifference, perfectionism cannot 
refute liberalism by just emphasizing the necessity of promoting valuable political choices. 
Maybe the stakes for perfectionism are higher. Maybe perfectionism does not simply want to 
recommend the choice of the more valuable of two alternatives, but aims for the intrinsically 
and absolutely best for societies and citizens. If this is the goal of perfectionism, then 
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perfectionists must consider carefully whether the measures and policies with which they try 
to realize that end do not get into conflict with individual liberty. Contemporary perfectionists 
do not want to violate personal autonomy. But then it remains unclear how they can press the 




To understand the current prominence of perfectionism better, it is important to look closer at 
the prevalent definitions of perfectionism and to the alleged deficiencies of recent political 
philosophy that it claims to overcome. 
There is a striking difference between ancient and modern appearances of perfectionism. 
In ancient philosophy, political perfectionism is connected with a certain epistemological 
doctrine. Only some people are in a position to know the right and the good, and this 
knowledge gives them authority over others. Since this knowledge amounts to a form of 
absolute truth, the rulers seem to have the legitimate basis to enforce a certain conception of 
the good on citizens and to mold them into virtuous citizens. 
Modern perfectionism is far from such ambitions. It moves within the framework of 
basic liberal values such as liberty, autonomy, and equality. But its central claim is that 
political philosophy has to presuppose a much closer connection between intrinsic values that 
are part of an objective theory of the good and public policies of governments than liberalism 
assumes. 
Thomas Hurka, for example, defines perfectionism as a form of moral theory that 
presupposes an ideal of human perfection based on the idea of ‘the good human life’ as ‘the 
intrinsically desirable life.’14 Hurka defines the good life as the one that develops the 
properties constitutive of human nature, human nature in the best possible way. Perfectionism, 
as he points out, can be understood as a conception of personal morality, but it can also find 
expression in a political doctrine. Perfectionism as a form of personal morality prescribes 
what sort of persons individuals should be and how they should act in their relations to others 
to be perfectly good. As a political doctrine, perfectionism builds on the principle that the 
‘best political act, institution or government is that which most promotes the perfection of all 
humans.’15 Hurka starts from an Aristotelian account of the good life and human nature, and 
he defends a consequentialist perfectionism that makes human perfection partially dependent 
on human choices, but also dependent on outside factors.16 
It is a standard objection that perfectionism is tempted to enforce policies in a way that 
comes into conflict with the principle of liberty. A government with perfectionist ambitions 
will, as critics point out, inevitably and in good faith use its power to realize its ideals and to 
coerce people to strive for excellence. Against this worry, Hurka claims that perfectionism can 
regard autonomy as an intrinsic good and can uphold a liberty principle. Yet, he argues, a 
perfectionist valuing of autonomy obviously cannot entail that the state is never allowed to 
interfere in citizens’ private lives. Hence, autonomy can only be a good among others that 
sometimes may be outweighed by other values.17 
Hurka’s perfectionism acknowledges autonomy as a non-absolute principle. 
Restrictions of a person’s autonomy are justified if they increase her future autonomy. Quite 
in the tradition of liberal theoreticians, he states that ‘the state should not interfere with 
liberty except to protect the greater liberty of others.’18 So Hurka’s reasons for justifying 
restrictions of autonomy have to be different from the ones that defenders of liberalism offer, 
otherwise the argument would remain in the liberal paradigm and would fail to show the 
compatibility of autonomy and perfectionism. Hurka tries to frame the argument in the 
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language of perfectionism, namely: If perfectionism affirms a liberty principle by considering 
autonomy to be an intrinsic good, then any restriction on it ‘threatens some perfectionist 
cost’ and seems unjustified. Hence, only the promotion of a greater perfectionist good, 
namely ‘the greater liberty of others,’ allows the state to restrict the liberty of a person.19 
 Liberalism equally justifies restrictions of autonomy, but the reasons liberalism offers 
are different. The liberal justification is free from any appeal to a perfectionist or a greater 
perfectionist good; it just refers to liberty and to the scope of that basic value. Yet, in Hurka’s 
argument the perfectionist aspect does not carry the weight of the justification. Perfection does 
not play the decisive role in showing why restrictions of liberty might be legitimate. The 
crucial question for Hurka is whether restrictions of liberty increase the future liberty of a 
person. But this amounts to a weighing of two goods that does not include the idea of 
perfection. It does not express a longing for the perfect if we choose one of two options on the 
ground that this option seems the better alternative. One might be content with the slightly 
better option as an improvement that seems possible and realistic under the circumstances. It 
is a basic postulate of rationality to go for the better and more promising. But to read the 
choice of the better of two alternatives as an expression of a striving for perfection would 
mean to turn most moral and political theories into perfectionist theories by definition.20 That 
way we would trivialize perfectionism. So the need for legitimate restrictions of autonomy 
does not as such retain an argument for perfectionism. 
In the sphere of the personal, aiming for perfection is up to individuals. They decide 
what use they want to make of their personal resources for perfecting whatever ends they 
regard as worth the effort B whether they want to be excellent musicians, poets, or basketball 
players or whether none of these goals attract them. Perfection can equally be directed to the 
realization of morally relevant attributes and ends. If these attributes refer to characteristics of 
persons, then we are in the territory of individual morality. 
 Most moral theories21 acknowledge the notion of perfection in the realm of personal 
morality. Kant, for example, identifies the morally good action with acting from a good will, 
with acting in conformity with the criteria constitutive of a good will. Moral perfection means 
to acquire a good will. Kant’s separation between morality and law, the way he associates 
morality with inner freedom and law with external freedom shows clearly that for Kant moral 
perfection is left to individuals.22 Autonomous and, henceforth, self-legislating individuals 
decide whether they are willing to follow the claims of morality, whether they see themselves 
under the moral law. In the realm of personal morality state interference is not allowed. The 
state may not get hold of the inner life of the members of society to force them to be perfectly 
virtuous beings. State interference is only appropriate in the sphere of law, when the freedom 
of one person gets into conflict with the freedom of others. Kant is explicit in that any attempt 
of governments to force citizens to adopt a certain conception of the good life would amount 
to despotism.23 
Hurka himself points out the limits of state action. Since perfection refers to something 
‘active and inner’ and the perfectionist good consists ‘in a certain inner state of character,’ 
the borders of interference seem obvious.24 The state cannot force citizens into being perfectly 
virtuous. But the argument that the state should not invade the inner life of individuals out of 
respect for liberty rights is usually taken as a justification of liberal neutrality. Yet, Hurka does 
not infer from the fact that there are limits to state intervention that perfectionism loses the 
case to liberal neutrality and to liberalism. He takes the obvious limits to state interference to 
support the thesis that perfectionism and liberalism hang together. The view that 
perfectionism cannot be enforced from outside ‘connects perfectionism with liberalism and 
also gives liberalism a new rationale. The liberal commitment to liberty need not rest on 
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agnosticism about the good or on the view that only free choice is good. It can be grounded in 
a deep fact about human perfection: that each person’s achievement of it must be largely her 
own.’25 
This argument is puzzling, as it just reaffirms the position of liberalism. It does not 
establish perfectionism as an alternative to liberalism. Liberalism, as the discussion in the first 
part of this paper showed, is not agnostic in regard to the good. It connects liberty and 
autonomy with a theory about the good. Kantian liberalism does not ban the idea of 
perfection, but confines it to the realm of personal morality and demarcates the borders of 
intervention by the principle of neutrality. Hurka admits, on the one hand, the necessity of 
neutrality, on the other hand, he tries to win from this fact an argument for perfectionism. But 
if it is part of liberalism to leave personal perfection to individuals, then one cannot interpret 
this as a justification of perfectionism as a viable option to liberalism. The admittance of 
perfection in the personal realm does not establish perfectionism as a doctrine of political 
philosophy. 
Hurka wants to make perfectionism attractive as a political philosophy. On the political 
level, perfectionism holds that those government policies and regulations are good that 
promote best the perfection of all humans.26 But Hurka cannot avoid the issue of neutrality in 
the realm of politics. This follows from his definition of perfection as an ‘active and inner’ 
state of character. As he admits, there is a deep asymmetry internal to perfectionism. People 
may well promote their own perfection, though not the perfection of others. Governments may 
supply the conditions so that the members of society may pursue their perfectionist ambitions. 
Yet, any attempt by state institutions to directly guide citizen’s perfection by force is likely to 
produce contrary effects. Habituating citizens into excellence ‘more commonly strengthens 
attitudes inimical’ to ‘the best motivation.’27 
At this point, the question whether there are any substantial differences between 
liberalism and Hurka’s autonomy-inclined perfectionism comes up. A perfectionism that 
endorses neutrality, liberty, absence of force, and keeps a distance to any appeal to absolute 
truth earns our sympathy, but doubt arises as to whether, instead of perfectionism, in fact we 
approve liberalism in a slightly disguised form. I think the dispute between liberalism and 
perfectionism focuses mainly on the following points: first, the underlying theory of value, 
second, the attitude to paternalism, and third a different account of the responsibility of 
governments to subsidize education, culture, and social life. But one has to look closer to see 
whether the approaches of liberalism and perfectionism to these issues amount to differences 
that give rise to two distinctive paradigms of political philosophy. 
Perfectionism presupposes an objective theory of the good and some perfectionists 
stress the notion of intrinsic value. Hurka states that governments must base the justification 
of their policies on the idea that ‘some ways of life are intrinsically preferable to others.’28 
But why should the idea that there are intrinsic values as such already support perfectionism? 
This has to do with a deficiency in some versions of liberalism. Some forms of liberalism 
defend a subjective conception of value. That means, they presuppose that values and what is 
valuable ‘depends on people’s actual preferences, choices or affective states.’29 According 
to a preference-based understanding of values, something is a value if it is chosen, if someone 
has a preference for it. A value is, therefore, the expression of a mere subjective desire or 
choice. 
Value subjectivism is not a convincing position.30 We can have good reasons to 
rationally reflect on our desires and ask ourselves whether our choices can be justified by 
principles that others cannot reasonably reject. But from the fact that it seems plausible to 
move to an objective, respectively intersubjective, theory of values, a theory that does not 
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reduce values to the immediate expression of desires and preferences, we cannot deduce that 
perfectionism is more persuasive than liberalism. There are forms of liberalism that 
presuppose objective theories of the good and of values. So, on the level of their 
understanding of values the differences between perfectionism and liberalism are not 
decisive.31 
Sometimes perfectionists already take the commitment of a political theory to values as 
an argument for reading that theory as a form of perfectionism. The reason for this strange 
interpretation goes back to Rawls’s understanding of perfectionism. Rawls associates the 
principle of perfection with the idea of intrinsic value, and he keeps the notion of value as an 
expression of the good separated from the principles of justice that belong to the right: 
‘Intrinsic worth is a notion falling under the concept of value, and whether equal liberty or 
some other principle is appropriate depends upon the conception of right.’32 This way, Rawls 
distinguishes sharply between values and principles, and he does not consider that the 
principles of justice express an underlying conception of value. Yet, we can ask ourselves 
whether freedom and equality are both valuable for their own sake, whether one of them has 
only instrumental value, and how they relate to the overriding value that the members of 
society should be treated as ends. Political liberalism is based on a conception of basic 
political values and, moreover, it can make room for an elaborated theory of moral values. 
Hence, the mere appeal to values does not suffice to understand a political theory as a form of 
perfectionism. 
A next point of difference between perfectionism and liberalism concerns their accounts 
of paternalism. Perfectionism allows a moderate paternalism that approves ‘seatbelt 
legislation, compulsory medical insurance, and perhaps laws discouraging smoking.’33 
Perfectionism characteristically justifies paternalism by appeal to a conception of the good as 
a form of human excellence. Aiming for perfection, henceforth, seems indispensable to justify 
certain restrictions of individual freedom that are in the interest of all. 
I do not think that a reference to ideas of a morally valuable or otherwise perfectly good 
life is necessary to find a justification for paternalistic interventions. It is, moreover, highly 
problematic. Do we have to justify prohibitions against smoking in public places by an appeal 
to a conception of the perfect life? Do we have to base them on the claim that a smoker’s way 
of life is less valuable than a non-smoker’s way of life? The perfectionist appeal to the 
promotion of the more perfect way of life is a dangerous way of arguing. If we justify 
restrictions of freedom in a certain case by reference to an ideal of the good life  that seems 
more perfect and more worthwhile than others, then we have to acknowledge this way of 
reasoning as a general principle. But then we might be confronted with the situation that the 
freedom to lead a nonreligious life is at stake since a nonreligious life does not seem to many 
citizens sufficiently perfect. And we might also be confronted with the demand that 
homosexual marriages and partnerships should be forbidden since they do not conform to the 
ideals of perfection and intrinsic values many citizens entertain. The obvious reply by 
perfectionists is that this will not happen in a freedom-based perfectionism. But the tension 
between autonomy and the perfect is obviously there, and the question is whether the idea of 
the good and perfect does not have priority in a veritable perfectionism. 
Liberalism justifies paternalistic restrictions on the basis of three principles, the 
principle of equal freedom, the principle of negative consequences, and the harm principle. 
The first considers restrictions as legitimate if they are necessary to protect the liberty rights of 
others. The second principle regards restrictions as justified if noninterference were to lead to 
greater negative consequences for another person than interference. The harm principle sees 
restrictions of freedom as legitimate if they help to avoid harm in general. 
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Restrictions on smoking can be justified by the harm principle and the principle of 
negative consequences. Seatbelt legislation can be justified with the harm principle. The 
identification of something harmful as bad and of pain as something to be avoided is not 
bound to the idea of perfection. We do not need the idea of the perfect to be able to introduce 
the concept of pain or harm. The harm principle and the principle of negative consequences 
belong to the liberal tradition.34 So we can conclude that, with regard to the justification of 
paternalistic interventions, liberalism does at least as well as, maybe even better than 
perfectionism. 
In the question of government responsibilities for the funding of education and culture, 
the case for perfectionism seems more promising. Do we not have to appeal to the idea of 
intrinsically more valuable forms of life to justify compulsory education as well as the funding 
of school systems and of cultural institutions such as theaters, opera houses, and concert halls? 
The obvious answer why a society should fund these institutions seems to be that these 
institutions are valuable, that they make social and cultural life richer, that they promote 
artistic expression and reflection, that they are important so that a society forms its social and 
cultural identity. 
Some liberals, for example John Rawls, have not developed a plausible account of why 
cultural institutions should be supported. Due to his strict anti-perfectionism, Rawls denies 
that public funding for universities, research institutions, operas and theaters can be justified 
by an appeal to their being ‘intrinsically valuable.’ Rawls thinks that such funding is only 
legitimate if it is ‘promoting directly or indirectly the social conditions that secure the equal 
liberties and as advancing in an appropriate way the long-term interests of the least 
advantaged.’35 He obviously bases the justification on his two principles of justice. But it is 
strange to base the justification of public funding exclusively on the principle of equal 
freedom and the demand to improve the conditions of the least privileged. 
Rawls evaluates cultural institutions too exclusively in the light of their contribution to 
democratic political conditions, conditions that are conducive to freedom and equality. We 
seem to reflect on the wrong level if we justify the funding of cultural institutions such as 
opera houses and theaters as a contribution to liberty, to equality, and to democratic political 
conditions. We should, in this context, remember Michael Walzer’s advice that societies 
should be careful to develop criteria for the different spheres of social life, criteria that are 
adequate to the paramount value attitudes and considerations in that sphere. That opera houses 
and other cultural institutions are valuable and deserve to be funded has something to do with 
the fact that we consider art and artistic expression to be something valuable and less with our 
respect for basic democratic values. What Rawls seems to miss is that we can find an 
overlapping consensus also in regard to important cultural values. 
Yet, even the case of funding cultural institutions does not show that perfectionism is a 
more convincing political theory than liberalism. Liberalism is not confined to the view that 
only the values inherent in the principles of justice are decisive, and that beyond the basic 
values of freedom and equality indifference towards the different conceptions of the good 
dominates. No liberal society could do with that. Liberalism simply demands that the basic 
rights that derive from the ideas of liberty and equality are paramount and that ideas of the 
good, even if they seem intrinsically valuable, ideal, and perfect, may not violate the basic 
freedom. But this leaves space for all sorts of value disputes, including those directed at the 
proper funding of cultural institutions and events. 
 Art funding need not be an expression of a comprehensive conception that invades all 
areas of life. We may consider the values expressed in art and culture as freestanding, as 
values that do not commit one to a comprehensive conception. These values open up more 
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dimensions than only freedom and equality, but they do not dispense with the basic 
foundations of a liberal society. And they do not turn the idea of perfection into a doctrine that 
must necessarily underlie public decisions. Perfection means aiming for the best. But a 
government that supports art does not act on the premises and principles of perfectionism, 
even if its funding policy is based on the view that art is worthwhile. In this context, 
perfection is the task of artists. Governments support cultural institutions because a large part 
of the members of society express attitudes of respect to them and because there are good 
reasons to regard these institutions as valuable. But this no more commits governments to 
perfectionism than a smoker giving up smoking turns him into a perfectionist. Far from 
having noble ambitions, he might have realized that he had good reason to do so, namely to 
protect his health and avoid the worst. 
So we see that a reflection on the problems on which the dispute between perfectionism 
and liberalism focuses B namely values, paternalism, and state funding of culture B does not 
establish that perfectionism should be preferred to liberalism. It just shows that some 
modifications of certain liberal assumptions are necessary. The principle that the idea of equal 
freedom has priority in regard to perfectionist values and ambitions is not undermined if we 
let cultural values influence our social life so that even some political decisions are based on a 
consensus in respect to their importance. One task of political morality is to provide space for 
the development of personal values and personal perfectionistic ambitions. Another is to 
articulate those basic values that are the overriding parameters for political reflection, 
parameters that need not be the basis of each and every political decision, but that might not 
be ignored in the overall design. 
In the last two decades, philosophers expressed great uneasiness with liberalism. 
Communitarians, for example, perceive liberalism as a right-based political theory that 
neglects social values such as empathy, care, and solidarity. This picture of liberalism is 
inadequate. Liberalism can admit rich value conceptions. It just specifies some paramount 
values that cannot be dispensed with by our inclinations to more particular values. But there 
has been a certain neglect of questions of value in some forms of liberalism. 
One reason for the liberal focus on basic values and rights to the exclusion of other 
values is certainly the worry that the deep and fundamental convictions some groups of 
society have about the good, the valuable, and the ideal are potentially dangerous for the 
autonomy of those that do not match these ideals and do not share those convictions. The most 
effective barrier against territorial overstepping in the name of the good is the guarantee of 
basic rights to all. Yet, there is no reason to regard the principles associated with basic rights 
as the sole values important for public life. 
The narrow conception of values that is characteristic for parts of liberalism creates 
another problem that may explain the strong interest in perfectionism in recent political 
philosophy. It is the problem of what brings people to keep to the rules of liberal society and, 




The concept of civic virtue plays a central role in the discussions about the merits and 
shortcomings of liberalism, perfectionism, and republicanism.36 It is an interesting aspect of 
the current debates that defenders of perfectionism meanwhile read communitarianism as a 
form of perfectionism.37 The main reason for this interpretation seems to be that 
communitarians defend an objective theory of the good that makes strong claims in regard to 
the value attitudes of the members of society: they should adhere to community values and to 
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the values of the social groups they grew up in. There are other shifts to observe. Michael 
Sandel, one of the foremost communitarian critics of liberalism, now describes his position as 
a form of republicanism.38 One of the reasons he offers for this move is his approval of the 
republican understanding of virtue and civic virtue. Sandel is sensitive to the criticisms, not 
least from the side of feminist philosophers, that communitarianism is uncritical to the 
problematic side of conventional social bonds. In the republican tradition, he finds the sources 
for a more convincing account of civic virtue. But why should the appeal to the notion of civic 
virtue commit us to perfectionism or republicanism? 
Why do democratic societies need virtuous citizens? Why do societies need more than 
that a large part of its members keeps to the laws? A state under the rule of law is not an 
institution of moral earnings and moral sentiments; it is foremost an institution that seeks to 
establish rules for a coexistence free of violence. But, so the well-known objection goes, a 
state by the rule of law cannot produce the socio-moral foundations that it has to rely on to 
design the rules for living together cooperatively.39 This need for a socio-moral basis of a rule-
governed society also creates the demand for civic virtues. 
The tradition of political theory sympathizing with republicanism and perfectionism 
associates ‘civic virtue’ with the willingness to give up claims to one’s subjective advantage 
in order to promote the common good. Political community is considered to be a value in 
itself. Citizens display civic virtue if they are willing to step back from their egoistic interests 
and promote the common good. 
In republicanism, the concept of civic virtue is connected with the idea of political self-
legislation, of seeing oneself under the law of a general will, as in Rousseau’s political 
philosophy. This demands certain civic attitudes. A citizen that sees herself bound by the law 
of a general will also sees herself bound by the idea of the common good. The more specific 
political virtues associated with the idea of citizenship, namely the participation in the 
political activities and public activities of the community, are one specific aspect of the idea of 
self-legislation in the public sphere. 
Often, philosophers draw a sharp distinction between liberalism and republicanism that 
does not do justice to some forms of liberalism. Liberalism becomes associated with the 
rational maximization of egoistic, foremost economic interests. Liberalism is described as the 
philosophy of negative liberty, the doctrine that just supports market interests. From these 
premises, critics argue, we can hardly win a plausible conception of civic virtue. 
In republicanism, to continue this description of the opposition between liberalism and 
republicanism, we find instead a positive conception of freedom. A positive conception of 
freedom is associated with the idea that a society should enable its citizens to realize the ends 
of their choices by providing them with the necessary means for doing so. One aspect of this 
positive conception of freedom is the idea of self-legislation. Self-legislation finds an 
expression in the sphere of personal morality, in the idea that a subject gives herself the moral 
law. But self-legislation is also present in the realm of political morality B bound to the well-
being of the community. Civic virtue is conceived as the voluntary contribution to the 
common good. Philosophers often argue that republicanism gives an account of the social-
moral presuppositions of democratic societies, whereas the liberal model only reflects the 
socio-economic presuppositions of society.40 
This description of liberalism is adequate to libertarianism, but it does not do justice to 
egalitarian liberalism. The egalitarian versions of liberalism are not restricted to negative 
liberty and the egoistic pursuit of one’s interests. In the conceptions of Rawls and Dworkin 
we find the idea that autonomy demands certain means, i.e., primary goods or resources that 
make individuals positively free. 
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Equally, egalitarian liberals do not ignore the concept of civic virtue. Rawls is well 
aware that his conception of a well-ordered society needs citizens who act in accordance with 
the principles of justice. The stability of society depends on the acceptance of the principles of 
justice. Rawls assumes that the members of society have, due to a reasonable socialization, a 
sense of justice that motivates them to respect the basic principles.41 The problem of stability 
shows quite clearly that liberal societies are dependent on the moral dispositions and virtues 
of their members. Hence, republicans and perfectionists can only make their positions stronger 
by demonstrating that the liberal account of civic virtue is deficient. 
If civic virtue is defined as the disposition to keep to the rules of justice, then respect for 
the rights of others becomes the central virtue. Republicans and perfectionists interpret the 
concept of civic virtue differently. To be a full citizen means to participate in the life of the 
community and to develop bonds with the society in which one lives. This, they claim, needs 
more than a sense of justice and fairness, namely a sense of community and solidarity. The 
members of a society should feel responsible for those with whom they make up a 
community. 
This understanding of civic virtue emphasizes aspects that are certainly not prominent in 
some versions of radical liberalism, but it is actually not too far from the account of civic 
virtue egalitarian liberalism offers. The virtue of respect for the rights of others is central in 
that conception. Solidarity enters the stage in the form of respect for the social rights of others. 
Liberalism does not leave solidarity on the level of contingent feelings and sentiments. If one 
does not want to turn solidarity into a form of compassion and charity, then it seems 
reasonable to define it as respect for the claims of others to social protection. The obvious 
objection here is that this brings us right back to the shortcomings of liberalism. 
To assess this criticism, one has to consider carefully to which form of virtue exactly the 
critique appeals. The problem is that sometimes republicans, perfectionists, and 
communitarians do not draw a sharp distinction between public morality and personal 
morality, between the virtues associated with the acceptance of the basic principles of society 
and those virtues that belong to the realm of individual morality. Of course, a society is a 
better place to live in if its members live up to the high standards of individual morality and 
display virtues such as empathy and compassion for their fellow human beings. Care, 
empathy, friendliness, and compassion create a climate of trust and social quality. But it is 
important to notice that these phenomena are part of individual morality and are created by the 
individual’s willingness to subscribe to the moral principles underlying these attitudes. 
Personal morality, this is something perfectionists admit, cannot be enforced by the state. 
The term ‘virtue’ in the context of ‘virtuous members of society’ can be meant to 
refer to the virtues of individual morality, i.e., the attitudes of a morally decent person, 
moreover to those specific virtues that citizens on the level of public morality should display. 
In democratic societies, public morality is centered around the basic values of liberty, 
autonomy, and equality. Civic virtue in regard to public morality means, as pointed out above, 
respect for the rights of others, namely their rights to noninterference, to political participation 
and their social rights. So we see that the socio-moral foundations of a state by the rule of law 
are constituted by both spheres, the sphere of personal as well as that of public morality. 
If we keep the separation of public and personal morality in mind, we see that the 
critique of the liberal conception of civic virtue is not justified. As public morality is 
constituted by the values of liberty and equality, it is perfectly fine if one defines ‘civic 
virtue,’ when it refers to the level of public morality, as the disposition to keep to the rules 
that correspond to these values. The familiar critique that this amounts to an impoverished 
notion of virtue is henceforth not convincing, since this objection draws exactly on the 
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categories and full possibilities of individual morality. Of course, the maxims, attitudes, and 
virtues displayed by people holding to the standards of personal morality add up to a rich 
social life and make societies better. Who would deny that triviality? But it is not the job of a 
political doctrine to develop and enforce a theory of individual morality. It is enough if it 
gives space to it. 
The recent renaissance of perfectionism has to do a lot with the endeavor to make 
political philosophy morally more substantial. Perfectionism moves on both levels, the level 
of individual morality and the level of public morality. I have argued in this article that the 
idea of moral perfection finds its adequate place in the realm of individual morality. Hence, 
liberalism and perfectionism are compatible as long as the idea of perfection refers to 
excellence in the realm of personal morality. That a society needs citizens who strive for 
moral improvement and maybe even perfection is no reason to adopt perfectionism as a 
political doctrine. 
Can perfectionism as a political theory be an alternative to liberalism? There is a 
striking difference between classical and modern versions of perfectionism. Classical 
perfectionism defends a compulsory model for the moral education of citizens. The current 
defenders of perfectionism hold that governments should enact policies to improve the moral 
quality of the lives of their citizens, but they are careful to point out their respect for 
individual autonomy and the fact of pluralism. But then the aim to improve the moral quality 
of citizens’ lives reduces to quite a moderate goal that is, moreover, shared by liberalism, 
namely: the state should provide the legal and social framework for the moral improvement 
and moral perfection of its citizens. As morality is not part of the sphere of external freedom, 
but is a matter of internal freedom, only individuals can perfect themselves. The state can just 
offer incentives by offering education and cultural life. And this brings us back to liberalism. 
Perfectionism cannot reach beyond that cautious form of motivating moral improvement as it 
would violate the central principle of democratic political theory, the idea of autonomy. 
Autonomy states that people choose the way of life they want to lead. In the realm of personal 
morality, autonomy is connected with the idea of realizing the valuable. Yet, even if we think 
that we should understand autonomy as a ‘perfectionist principle’ directed at the valuable,42 
it still holds that moral improvement is up to the autonomous will of people. It cannot be 
enforced from outside. Perfectionism as a political doctrine that does not want to violate basic 
standards of freedom and autonomy reduces to the project of offering incentives for moral 
improvement. And this project by itself does not establish perfectionism as a political theory 
that can claim to be an alternative to liberalism. 
Societies are better if their citizens are good persons. But how good they want to be, 
what ideals of perfection they have and hold to, is up to them. In a way, it is hard to leave such 
a large part of the moral quality of a society to the will of individuals to act well. It may seem 
a too contingent basis. Nevertheless, political philosophy should resist the temptation to get a 
stronger hold on the idea of civic virtue. The concept of civic virtue and what it positively 
implies gets strongest in the hands of citizens. This is the prize of autonomy-based political 
philosophy: to leave citizens on their own in their moral endeavors and to trust them in their 
efforts to make the best of it. There will be inevitable disappointments, but altogether such a 
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theory. But I do not think that Raz offers a decisive argument why the harm principle 
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harm@ entails by its very meaning that the action is prima facie wrong, it is a normative 
concept acquiring its specific meaning from the moral theory within which it is 
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perfectionism. Most perfectionists try to define perfectionism more clearly. Hurka 
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the notion of civic virtue. I do not want to analyze in detail which types of virtues a 
liberal society presupposes. Candidates in this context are tolerance, courage, law-
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Galston (1991), ch. 10. I will not go into a discussion of such catalogues of liberal 
virtues here. One problem of these specifications of liberal virtues is that they 
sometimes reach far into the sphere of personal morality. 
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41 See Rawls (1971), ’ 76. In his later work, Rawls modifies that solution of the stability 
problem as he gives more attention to the fact of pluralism. The answer to the problem 
of stability Rawls now finds in an overlapping consensus that is reached if the members 
of a society can generate arguments for the acceptance of the principles of justice from 
the background of differing religious or philosophical conceptions. The political values 
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not dependent on a certain comprehensive conception. The sense of justice still 
guarantees that citizens respect just institutions. But the reasons for the acceptance of 
the basic political values derive from different worldviews. 
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